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5.1    Introduction
Public employment oﬃces are nonproﬁ  t governmental organizations 
that match job-  seekers and employers, one of their main purposes being 
to reduce job search costs in order to improve job-  seekers’ success in ﬁ  nd-
ing a job in the labor market.1 As a labor market intermediary, public 
employment oﬃces have existed in all of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries since the 1950s (Wal-
wei 1996). Recent trends in European countries have been to deregulate 
and privatize employment services since the 1990s (De Koning, Denys, and 
Walwei 1999). Interestingly, the opposite trend took place in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The establishment of public employ-
ment oﬃces was a widespread phenomenon in both Europe and North 
America during this time.2 Many countries also passed laws to abolish or 
strictly regulate private employment agencies (Martinez 1976; Finkin and 
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Jacoby 2005).3 As a result, the labor exchange market was monopolized by 
the central government in these countries. This institutional feature did not 
change until the late 1980s.
In this chapter, I provide a rationale for the establishment of public 
employment oﬃces and explore the relationship between the development of 
public employment oﬃces and labor market conditions in the United States 
in order to argue that public employment oﬃces were eﬀective in protecting 
job-  seekers, who lacked information and networks with regard to the job 
search process, from malpractice by private employment agencies.
In the ﬁ  rst part of this chapter, I propose a theory that exploitation by 
private employment agencies with respect to job- seekers resulted from asym-
metric information between job-  seekers and private employment agencies. 
Job- seekers who are uninformed cannot distinguish between high-  and low-
  quality agencies, and this may cause them to not pay for high-  quality ser-
vices. This situation could give private employment agencies an incentive to 
exploit uninformed job-  seekers (provide low-  quality services) due to their 
proﬁ  t-  maximizing behavior, thus causing adverse selection. Consequently, 
the market may disappear—or only low-  quality agencies may survive.4 In 
theory, it is possible that introducing public employment oﬃces may elimi-
nate low-  quality agencies that exploit uninformed job-  seekers, increase 
competition in the labor exchange market, and thus improve labor market 
eﬃciency. The introduction of public employment oﬃces may remove low-
  quality private employment agencies because such agencies cannot survive 
if uninformed job-  seekers use public employment oﬃces without charge 
and without the risk of malpractice, while informed job-  seekers use public 
employment oﬃces or high-  quality private employment agencies. As a 
result, no one would use low-  quality private employment agencies, which 
would cause them to eventually disappear. This implies that the introduction 
of public employment oﬃces could resolve the problem of adverse selection, 
as they provide an alternative network to uninformed job-  seekers in the 
labor exchange market.
In the second part of this chapter, I estimate the number of job-  seekers 
using public employment oﬃces as a percentage of the labor force to exam-
ine the development of public employment oﬃces in the U.S. labor market 
over time. The data show that public employment oﬃces grew substantially 
3. The Canadian Labor Congress requested the complete abolition of private employment 
agencies in 1913. The German government began to abolish private employment agencies in 
1922. Austria declined to issue any new licenses for new businesses after World War I. Finland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria completely eliminated private employment agencies by 1926 (Martinez 
1976).
In the early twentieth century, state governments in the United States (e.g., Washington) tried 
to abolish private employment agencies, but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled their attempts to be 
unconstitutional (Finkin and Jacoby 2005).
4. In this chapter, private employment agencies that exploit uninformed job seekers are 
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and became a major labor market intermediary concurrent with the U.S. 
involvement in World War I. The use of public employment oﬃces by job-
 seekers as a percentage of the labor force was at least 4 percent between 1916 
and 1940. This shows that public employment oﬃces played an important 
role in the labor market, and thus could aﬀect the behavior of job-  seekers 
and private employment agencies.
In the third part of this chapter, I show that the majority of public employ-
ment oﬃce users were unskilled workers, immigrants, or migrants in the 
early twentieth century. These workers were also major clients of private 
employment agencies in this period. This ﬁ  nding suggests that these workers, 
who were most likely to be abused by private employment agencies, tended 
to utilize public employment oﬃces for their job search.
Finally, I test the relationship between the use of public employment oﬃces 
and changes in labor market conditions, which were related to asymmetric 
information such as proportions of immigrants, migrants, and unskilled 
workers. The key ﬁ  nding is that the relationship between the use of public 
employment oﬃces and interstate migration is positive and signiﬁ  cant in 
most speciﬁ  cations. This positive correlation may support the hypothesis 
that public employment oﬃces contributed to lowering the degree of asym-
metric information for interstate migrants who were most likely to lack 
information and networks with regards to the job search process, and thus 
the most vulnerable to exploitation by private employment agencies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 proposes a 
theory of public employment oﬃces. Section 5.3 provides the background 
of public employment oﬃces in relation to the labor market. Section 5.4 
presents the analysis of public employment oﬃce users. Section 5.5 provides 
the empirical work. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2      A Theory of Public Employment Oﬃces
Economists have put forth theories about the existence of labor market 
intermediaries, including private employment agencies (hereafter referred to 
as “private agencies”) and public employment oﬃces (hereafter referred to 
as “public oﬃces”), to explain why these intermediaries are necessary and 
how they help reduce transaction costs in the labor market (e.g., Pissarides 
1979; Yavas 1994; Kübler 1999). The fundamental intuition behind these 
theories is that labor market intermediaries can increase the eﬃciency of 
the job matching process by reducing transaction costs (Pissarides 1979; 
Yavas 1994). It has also been suggested that the coexistence of public and 
private agencies may improve an employer’s screening ability if there exists 
asymmetric information between job- seekers and employers (Kübler 1999). 
However, these theories do not explain why public oﬃces were introduced to 
restrain private agencies from malpractices with respect to job-  seekers. To 
explain this, I ﬁ  rst describe how severe the abuses by private agencies were 158    Woong Lee
and why these were possible. Next, I propose a theory of how public oﬃces 
served to limit the incidence of malpractices by private agencies.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, in response to the cries of job-
  seekers who were exploited by private agencies, social reformers and public 
oﬃcials tried to ﬁ  nd a solution, one of which was to create public oﬃces 
(Bogart 1900; Sargent 1912; Leiserson 1915; Herdon 1918).5 Two examples, 
which support the notion that public oﬃces were established to check on the 
actions of private agencies, are as follows:
[T]he establishment of free public employment oﬃces rests on the abuses 
which exist in the private agencies. . . . This point is made much of by the 
commissioners of labor in the various states, and their reports contain 
many instances of the deception and fraud practiced by these agencies 
on the unemployed. (Bogart 1900, 345)
One of the inﬂ  uences making for the rapid growth in the number and 
importance of public employment oﬃces has been the ﬂ  agrant evils con-
nected with these private employment agencies. (Herdon 1918, 5)
The most common malpractice by private agencies was the misrepresen-
tation of characteristics on occupations to job-  seekers (Commons and 
Andrews 1936). Sargent (1912, 36) summarizes common deceitful practices 
by private agencies, which took advantage of uninformed job-  seekers in 
some of the following ways:
1. Charging a fee and failing to make any eﬀort to ﬁ  nd work for the 
applicant.
2.  Sending applicants where no work exists.
3.  Sending applicants to distant points where no work or where unsat-
isfactory work exists, but whence the applicants will not return on account 
of expense involved.
4. Collusion between the agent and employer (e.g., foremen), whereby 
the applicant is given a few days work and then discharged to make way for 
new workmen; the agent and employer divide the fee.
5.  Charging exorbitant fees or giving jobs to such applicants as contribute 
extra fees, presents, and so on.
6.  Inducing workers who have been placed, particularly girls, to leave, pay 
another fee, and get a better job.
In addition to these malpractices, several private agencies were found to have 
actually sent women to houses of prostitution (Muhlhauser 1916).
5. Establishment of public oﬃces is an example of the Progressivism movement in the United 
States in the early twentieth century because they were introduced to eliminate the abuses by 
private agencies in response to the cries of job-  seekers. Thus, this governmental intervention 
was a kind of social justice to help disadvantaged people.
Stewart and Stewart (1933), Edwards (1935), Commons and Andrews (1936), and Martinez 
(1976) report that many European countries also established public oﬃces to prevent private 
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These abuses were possible because many job-  seekers who used private 
agencies were immigrants, unskilled workers, or temporary workers (Sargent 
1912; Commons and Andrews 1936; U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards 1962; 
Rosenbloom 2002). As such, they were most likely to be unfamiliar with 
the language and customs of the United States less educated, or had little 
legal recourse to recover damages from private agencies. Thus, I argue that 
exploitation by private agencies with respect to job-  seekers resulted from 
information asymmetry between job-  seekers and private agencies.
Private agencies that exploit job-  seekers can be described as low-  quality 
agencies. If job-  seekers cannot distinguish between high-   and low-  quality 
agencies or if their search cost is very high, then high-  quality agencies may 
have an incentive to reduce their service quality (if they stay in the market) 
because job-  seekers who use private agencies cannot pay for high-  quality 
services. Therefore, the market would disappear or only low- quality private 
agencies with severe abuses would prevail in the labor exchange market, 
meaning adverse selection. Furthermore, if private agencies exercise a high 
degree of market power, then the situation would become worse.
In general, there are two ways to reduce or eliminate asymmetric informa-
tion that causes adverse selection in this situation: increase in search costs 
(for information gathering) by job-  seekers, and signals by private agencies. 
Increase in search costs to distinguish between high-  and low- quality private 
agencies is burdensome because job- seekers need to make additional eﬀort. 
Moreover, it is very costly to those who are unfamiliar with a new environ-
ment, less educated, or needy (such as immigrants, unskilled workers, and 
temporary workers). Theoretically, signaling by high-  quality private agen-
cies is feasible, but there may be a possibility of a pooling equilibrium.6
The creation of public oﬃces to provide job-  seekers with placement ser-
vices can be seen as a mechanism to eliminate low-  quality private agen-
cies, and thus resolve adverse selection caused by asymmetric information 
between job-  seekers and private agencies in the labor exchange market. 
With the provision of public oﬃces, low-  quality private agencies may not 
survive because job- seekers who are uninformed can use public oﬃces with-
out charge and without the risk of malpractice, while job-  seekers who are 
informed can use public oﬃces or high- quality private agencies.7 Under ideal 
conditions, job-  seekers would be fully informed about the quality of the 
private agencies that they deal with, and thus could make a preferred choice 
along the quality- price locus. Public oﬃces may help in this regard by driving 
6. For example, low-  quality agencies may charge high fees to their clients to imitate high-
  quality service providers because high fees are usually accompanied by high-  quality services. 
This may result in a pooling equilibrium if both high-   and low-  quality agencies send high-
  quality signals to the clients.
7. An implicit assumption is that public oﬃces are credibly high quality because services are 
publicly provided. Even if job-  seekers are not sure about the credibility of public oﬃces, they 
could provide an eﬀective means to solve the information/ quality problem faced by job- seekers 
because services by public oﬃces are free.160    Woong Lee
deceptive private agencies from the market, allowing job-  seekers to choose 
to use either public oﬃces or credible private agencies. This implies that 
the creation of public oﬃces can resolve the problem of adverse selection, 
as an alternative network is provided to job-  seekers in the labor exchange 
market. Therefore, the introduction of public oﬃces may inject competition 
that either causes low-  quality private agencies to improve or drives them 
out of the market. Throughout this process, high-  quality private agencies 
survive, and without monopolization of the labor exchange market by the 
government, both public and private agencies can exist together to improve 
the eﬃciency of the labor market.
Besides the introduction of public oﬃces, state governments began to 
regulate private agencies even before public oﬃces were established (see, 
for example, Bogart 1900). Some state or municipal governments required 
private agencies to pay license fees, deposit bonds, or both. In addition, sev-
eral local governments imposed ﬁ  nes on private agencies or shut down their 
businesses when violation of the regulations was investigated.
Baldwin (1951) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards (1962) insisted 
that before World War I, public oﬃces did not function well and only restric-
tions on private agencies were eﬀective in the labor exchange market. How-
ever, Devine (1909), Sargent (1912), and Leiserson (1915) argued that restric-
tions on private agencies were ineﬀective and the creation of public oﬃces 
lessened the degree of malpractices, thus contributing to the protection of 
job-  seekers. It is an open question as to which institution worked better 
to keep private agencies in check, since there is little evidence of speciﬁ  c 
statistics or detailed reports to compare these two institutions.8 However, 
evidence supporting the eﬀectiveness of public oﬃces is as follows (State of 
Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics 1906, 3):
While the primary purpose in establishing these oﬃces was to aid the 
common or unskilled laborers in getting work without cost to him or her, 
their inﬂ  uence has not been limited to that class. . . . From this it is shown 
that nearly 8,000 people, representing established skilled trades, including 
commercial and professional pursuits, have secured positions during the 
year. . . . The better class of private employment agencies will accept only 
applications for a certain service, mainly of a professional character.9
8. Fee and bond regulations could be eﬀective because they are likely to raise costs by more 
for low- quality than high- quality agencies. But if there are no eﬀective means of enforcement, 
then such mandates would be unlikely to work. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional a New Jersey law regulating the fees that private agencies could charge their 
clients (Finkin and Jacoby 2005). In addition, inspection of private agencies could be very costly 
if there are many illegal (unlicensed) private agencies. Several states’ labor bureaus reported 
violations of the license law (see, for example, State of Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics 
1913 and State of California Bureau of Labor 1923).
9. In 1905 the total number of job-  seekers placed by Illinois public oﬃces was 39,598 and 
the number of applicants was 45,323.Private Deception and the Rise of Public Employment Oﬃces    1 6 1
5.3      Background of Public Employment Oﬃces
In this section, I provide evidence that public oﬃces were a major labor 
market intermediary and thus could aﬀect the behavior of job-  seekers and 
private agencies in the United States in the early twentieth century. To do 
this, I estimate the number of job- seekers who used public oﬃces (the use of 
public oﬃces by job- seekers) between 1890 and 1940 (see ﬁ  gure 5.1).10 I also 
measure the percentage of public oﬃce users in the labor force and compare 
this to the unemployment rate (see ﬁ  gure 5.2).
The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve (continuous) public oﬃces were established in Ohio in 1890.11 
Only ﬁ  fty-  one oﬃces were operated in nineteen states by 1910 (Herdon 
1918). The use of public oﬃces by job-  seekers as a percentage of the labor 
force also did not exceed 1 percent by 1910 (see ﬁ  gure 5.2). When immigra-
tion reached its highest point (1.4 million immigrants) in 1907, the fed-
eral government started to intervene in the labor exchange market (U.S. 
Employment Service 1935a). The Division of Information, the ﬁ  rst fed-
eral employment agency, was created in the Department of Commerce and 
Labor. However, its role was restricted to disseminating to immigrants over 
the states up until World War I (Guzda 1983). Although both federal and 
local public oﬃces contributed little to the labor market at that time, these 
organizations aimed to protect immigrants, who were unfamiliar with the 
urban environment in the United States, from the abuses of private agencies 
(International Labour Oﬃce 1955).
Many ﬁ  rms lost their foreign markets with the beginning of World War 
I, causing a serious unemployment problem, as shown by the relatively high 
unemployment rates in 1914 and 1915 (see ﬁ  gure 5.2). However, the prob-
lem of lack of labor demand changed to a shortage of labor supply upon 
the United States’ entry into World War I, especially due to higher labor 
demand in war-  related industries as well as demand by the military service 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1931). Accordingly, the Division of Infor-
mation, renamed as the U.S. Employment Service (USES), was reorganized 
to serve as a nationwide labor market intermediary to assist the wartime 
emergency in 1917. Most public oﬃces, which had the exclusive power of 
matching unskilled labor to industries, were under the control of USES 
during the nation’s involvement in World War I (Kellogg 1933). The use 
10. The ﬁ  rst (continuous) public oﬃces were established in Ohio in 1890, and the nationwide 
system of public oﬃces as a permanent labor market intermediary was set in the United States 
in 1940 (the author’s inspection). That is why the estimates in ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2 range from 
1890 and 1940.
11. There were a couple of trials to establish public employment oﬃces before 1890. Examples 
are the Castle Garden Labor Exchange in New York City, opened in 1850 (Rosenbloom 2002), 
and the California Labor Exchange, established in San Francisco in 1868 (U.S. Employment 
Service 1935b). These public employment agencies were eventually discontinued due to a lack 
of funds.Fig. 5.1    Use of public employment oﬃces by job-  seekers
Sources: 1890–1914: Bogart (1900), Conner (1907), Sargent (1912), and various state govern-
ments’ reports (State of Colorado Bureau of Labor Statistics 1903–1915; State of Connecti-
cut Bureau of Labor Statistics 1902–1915; State of Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics 1900–
1915; State of Indiana Department of Statistics 1911–1915; State of Kansas Bureau of Labor 
and Industry 1901–1914; State of Kansas Department of Labor and Industry 1914–1915; 
State of Kentucky Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Statistics 1912–1915; State of Maryland 
Bureau of Statistics and Information 1904–1915; State of Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics 
of Labor 1904, 1907–1915; State of Michigan Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics 
1906–1909; State of Michigan Department of Labor 1910–1915; State of Minnesota Bureau 
of Labor 1907; State of Minnesota Bureau of Labor 1907; State of Missouri Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1900–1916; State of Montana Bureau of Agriculture 1902–1912; State of Montana 
Department of Labor and Industry 1913–1916; State of New Jersey Department of Labor. 
Report 1910–1915; State of New York Department of Labor 1901–1916; State of Ohio Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics 1891–1914; State of Ohio Department of Investigation and Statistics 
1915–1916; State of Oklahoma Department of Labor 1908–1915; State of Rhode Island 
Bureau of Industrial Statistics 1908–1914; State of Washington Bureau of Labor 1903–1916; 
State of West Virginia Bureau of Labor Statistics 1901–1915; State of Wisconsin Bureau of 
Labor and Industrial Statistics 1902–1916). 1915–1916: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
January 1915 (Vol. 1, No. 1) to February 1918 (Vol. 6, No. 2). 1917–1919: U.S. Employment 
Service (1918, 1919, 1920). 1920–1921: Smith (1923), and Commons and Andrews (1936). 
1923–1930: U.S. Employment Service (January 1924 to January 1932). 1933: U.S. Employ-
ment Service (1935b). 1934–1939: U.S. Employment Service, September 1934 (Vol. 1, No. 1) 
to December 1940 (Vol. 7, No. 12).
Notes: 1923, 1931, and 1932 are missing. The following states in each year indicate missing 
data by state and year: 1903 to 1906 (Kansas); 1907 (Colorado); 1909 to 1910 (New Jersey); 
1912 (Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma); 1913 (New Jersey, Oklahoma, West Vir-
ginia); 1914 (California, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia). 
Data from 1915 to 1939 are reported for ﬁ  scal years (July to June).Private Deception and the Rise of Public Employment Oﬃces    1 6 3
of public oﬃces soared during the 1918 ﬁ  scal year (see ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2), 
mainly due to the massive number of returning soldiers and workers who 
had previously been transferred to war- related industries (U.S. Employment 
Service 1919). Soldiers and workers went back to their peacetime occupa-
tions after the war ceased, and public oﬃces played an important role in 
reallocating them to their former positions and other places (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 1931).
As the nation returned to normalcy, the use of public oﬃces by job-
  seekers dropped substantially. The USES, the central authority of public 
oﬃces during World War I, lost its power over the labor market due to huge 
budget cuts by Congress. Thus, a substantial number of oﬃces were closed 
or turned over to state and municipal governments (U.S. Employment Ser-
vice 1935a). The USES was a paper organization during the 1920s, meaning 
that the federal government’s power over the labor exchange market was 
minimal. Most public oﬃces were maintained and operated by states or 
municipalities independently of the federal government. Despite the decen-
tralization of public labor exchange, the use of public oﬃces was nontrivial. 
Most research and documents ignore public oﬃces’ contribution to the U.S. 
labor market in the 1920s (e.g., U.S. Employment Service 1935a; Commons 
and Andrews 1936; Adams 1969; Guzda 1983; Breen 1997). However, the 
evidence in ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2 shows that more than 2 million job- seekers, or 
Fig. 5.2    Unemployment rate and use of public employment oﬃces by job-  seekers 
as a percentage of the labor force
Sources: Labor force (LF) and the unemployment rate (Wier 1992) and the use of public em-
ployment oﬃces by job-  seekers (same as ﬁ  gure 5.1).164    Woong Lee
roughly 5 percent of the total labor force per year, used public oﬃces during 
the 1920s. Public oﬃces also made placements for 1.5 million job-  seekers 
(approximately 3 percent of the labor force) during this period. Therefore, I 
argue that the role of public oﬃces was also important in the labor market 
in the 1920s. One might think that public oﬃces played an important role in 
the labor market only during times of emergency, such as World War I and 
the Great Depression, as public oﬃces became centralized to resolve these 
chaotic situations. But public oﬃces continued to serve as a major labor 
market intermediary in the 1920s, which was a time of peace and economic 
growth.
As the economy entered the Great Depression, the Wagner-  Peyser Act 
of 1933 revitalized USES to be a nationwide employment service to control 
public oﬃces across the nation. It was a joint system of federal and state 
governments.12 As a main tool to perform New Deal relief programs for 
unemployment, public oﬃces were inﬂ  uential over the entire labor market 
during the Great Depression. The substantial increase in the use of public 
oﬃces by job- seekers in 1933 (as seen in ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2) was mainly due 
to the public works provided by the Civil Works Administration (CWA). The 
Civil Works Administration hired more than 4 million people, and almost all 
placements for this administration were made by public oﬃces. People who 
wanted to ﬁ  nd jobs in the CWA had to use public oﬃces (U.S. Employment 
Service 1935b).
Public oﬃces also placed millions of unemployed in jobs created by the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA). High use of public oﬃces since 
1935 indicates this (see ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2). The use of public oﬃces was 
also directly related to the unemployment compensation between 1937 and 
1939. The large increase in the use of public oﬃces between 1938 and 1939 
demonstrates this fact. Unemployment beneﬁ  ts were paid to jobless people, 
starting from January 1938, by the Social Security Act of 1935 (Atkinson, 
Odencrantz, and Deming 1938). People who wanted to receive these beneﬁ  ts 
had to register with public oﬃces.
One point should be mentioned about the two spikes (around World War 
I and the Great Depression) in the use of public oﬃces in ﬁ  gures 5.1 and 5.2, 
related to the argument in the previous section. The high use of public oﬃces 
by job- seekers during the periods of World War I and the Great Depression 
is irrelevant to the hypothesis that public oﬃces contributed to lowering the 
degree of asymmetric information between job- seekers and private agencies. 
Public oﬃces performed employment services for wartime emergency during 
World War I and matched job- seekers and public work positions as a major 
tool to implement the New Deal policies in the Great Depression.
12. The federal government would provide up to 50 percent of the fund support, the remain-
ing 50 percent being provided by the states to maintain and operate public oﬃces (Ruttenberg 
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Given all the information provided in this section, it is clear that the 
impact of public oﬃces on the labor market was not inﬂ  uential in the ﬁ  rst 
two decades of its operation. However, the importance of public oﬃces grew 
substantially, allowing them to be a major labor market intermediary with 
their involvement arising from World War I.13
5.4      Users of Public Employment Oﬃces
In this section, I analyze users of public oﬃces to test an implication of 
the theory proposed in section 5.2: The majority of job- seekers using private 
agencies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were unskilled work-
ers and immigrants who were vulnerable to the abuses of private agencies. 
If these job-  seekers used public oﬃces intensively, then this supports the 
hypothesis that public oﬃces contributed to lowering the degree of exploi-
tation by private agencies with respect to job-  seekers (the degree of asym-
metric information between job-  seekers and private agencies) by providing 
an alternative network during their job search process. Therefore, I evalu-
ate whether those who were vulnerable to exploitation by private agencies, 
such as unskilled workers and immigrants, actually used public oﬃces more 
intensively.
To do this, I present the gender and occupations of public oﬃce users. I 
also construct the corresponding shares of workers in the population (the 
nation and state) from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series or IPUMS 
(Ruggles et al. 2004) to see how public oﬃce users diﬀered from other work-
ers in the labor market in the early twentieth century.14 In addition, I show 
other characteristics of public oﬃce users to analyze how they were related 
to the argument regarding asymmetric information.
First, I construct the shares of public oﬃce users by gender for a few 
selected states (Connecticut, Missouri, and Illinois) and compare them to 
those in the nation and the corresponding states in the early twentieth cen-
tury (see table 5.1). In Connecticut and Illinois, the share of female public 
oﬃce users were much larger than those of female workers in the nation and 
in the states between 1900 and 1930, indicating that female workers used 
public oﬃces more intensively than male workers in those states. In Mis-
souri, the share of female public oﬃce users was larger than both the nation 
and the state female workers in 1900 (23.5 percent in Missouri public oﬃces, 
14.1 percent in the state of Missouri, and 18.0 percent in the nation), while 
this inequality was reversed between 1910 and 1920 (around 10 percent in 
Missouri public oﬃces, 17 percent in the state of Missouri, and 20 percent 
13. The use of public oﬃces by job-  seekers was at least 4 percent of the labor force between 
1916 and 1940 (see ﬁ  gure 5.2).
14. The estimates for the nation and state workers in tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 are con-
structed from the working age population (aged between sixteen and sixty-  ﬁ  ve, inclusive) in 
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in the nation). The shares of female workers in all cases (Missouri public 
oﬃces, the state of Missouri, and the nation) were almost the same in 1930. 
Overall, female workers used employment services through public oﬃces 
more intensively than male workers in Connecticut and Illinois, although 
this was not the case in Missouri.
Table 5.2 gives the proportions of public oﬃce users by occupation in 
the selected states over time. One clear pattern is that placements by public 
oﬃces were biased toward service workers and laborers.15 In Connecticut 
and Illinois, the largest proportion of public oﬃce users was service workers, 
while laborers formed the majority of public oﬃce users in Missouri (see the 
fourth, sixth, and eighth columns in table 5.2), respectively. As time went 
by, the importance of agriculture tended to dwindle in Connecticut (11.5 
percent in 1900, 14.9 percent in 1910, 3.7 percent in 1920, and 2.7 percent in 
1930), but in Missouri, the proportion of agricultural workers rose in 1920 
(14.1 percent), declining in 1930 (8.3 percent). All three states’ distributions 
of public oﬃces show a concentration of service workers and laborers, but 
the degree of concentration was diﬀerent. In Connecticut, approximately 




Year   Men   Women   State   Men   Women   Men   Women
1900 82.0 18.0 CT 78.6 21.4 49.1 50.9
1910 79.1 21.0 CT 75.1 24.9 52.1 47.9
1920 79.4 20.6 CT 74.1 25.9 57.7 42.3
1930 77.7 22.3 CT 73.5 26.5 56.1 43.9
1900 MO 85.9 14.1 76.5 23.5
1910 MO 83.2 16.8 89.8 10.2
1920 MO 81.5 18.5 89.5 10.5
1930 MO 79.2 20.9 80.0 20.0
1900 IL 83.5 16.5 57.2 42.8
1910 IL 81.3 18.7 71.6 28.4
1920 IL 79.5 20.5 76.9 23.1
1930           IL   77.2   22.8   62.0   38.0
Source: See table 5.2.
Notes: The second and third columns present the percentages of male and female workers in 
the nation, respectively. The ﬁ  fth and sixth columns present the percentages of male and fe-
male workers in the corresponding states, respectively. The seventh and eighth columns indi-
cate the percentages of male and female job seekers registered in public employment oﬃces in 
the corresponding states, respectively. All the percentages of the nation and states are calcu-
lated from the labor force of working age (i.e., aged between sixteen and sixty-  ﬁ  ve, inclusive).
15. Most of the public oﬃce applicants’ occupations were also laborers and service workers 
in Connecticut, Illinois, and Missouri. I provide only the placements of public oﬃce applicants 
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60 to 70 percent of applicants placed were service workers, whereas more 
laborers were placed than service workers in Missouri (see the fourth and 
sixth columns in table 5.2). The diﬀerential between service workers and 
laborers was not large in Illinois relative to that in Connecticut (see the 
eighth column in table 5.2).
To investigate the types of public oﬃce users in more detail, I examine the 
occupations of male and female public oﬃce users over time, respectively. 
The data show that male public oﬃce users were largely laborers and the 
dominant occupation for females was service work, although there were 
some variations among states.16 One clear fact is that the diﬀerence between 
Table 5.2  Occupations of male and female applicants placed by public employment oﬃces
CT MO IL
Occupation   Nation   State  
Public 
oﬃces   State  
Public 




Professionals and technical workers 4.5 5.0 0.2 4.7 0.2 5.6 0.0
Agricultural workers 33.4 10.3 11.5 39.5 3.2 24.2 2.5
Managers, oﬃcials, and proprietors 5.7 5.5 0.1 6.3 0.0 7.1 0.0
Clerical and kindred 3.4 4.0 2.2 3.8 8.3 5.3 0.4
Sales workers 4.5 5.2 8.0 5.2 4.0 6.1 0.7
Craftsmen and operatives 26.9 46.1 4.2 22.3 8.2 29.7 6.1
Service workers 9.3 9.0 66.7 8.6 24.4 9.9 40.3
Laborers 12.3 14.9 5.1 9.5 47.8 12.1 36.1
1910
Professionals and technical workers 4.9 5.6 0.1 5.0 0.0 5.6 0.0
Agricultural workers 28.6 7.4 14.9 32.8 5.8 18.7 1.6
Managers, oﬃcials, and proprietors 6.0 5.7 0.1 6.5 0.0 6.8 0.0
Clerical and kindred 5.6 7.1 0.4 6.4 0.3 8.7 0.6
Sales workers 4.7 4.9 4.0 5.6 1.4 5.8 0.9
Craftsmen and operatives 27.6 43.0 4.1 23.8 6.8 31.8 10.7
Service workers 9.5 10.8 61.1 9.1 35.5 9.5 43.7
Laborers 13.1 15.6 13.4 10.9 43.8 13.1 35.6
1920
Professionals and technical workers 5.6 6.3 0.0 5.7 0.1
Agricultural workers 24.1 6.3 3.7 28.8 14.1
Managers, oﬃcials, and proprietors 6.7 6.5 0.1 7.5 0.1
Clerical and kindred 8.3 10.2 0.5 9.0 4.2
Sales workers 5.0 4.3 2.8 6.0 0.2
Craftsmen and operatives 30.8 46.0 7.1 25.0 14.5
Service workers 8.1 7.9 71.8 8.0 19.4
Laborers 11.5 12.6 13.6 10.0 46.9
(continued)
16. Tables for men’s and women’s occupational shares are available from the author upon 
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public oﬃce users and other workers was not simply due to gender. Ser-
vice work for women and common labor for men were the main types of 
occupations dealt with by public oﬃces until 1930. Both service workers 
and laborers also made up the majority of private agencies’ clients, who 
were vulnerable to the abuses of private agencies in the early twentieth cen-
tury (Sargent 1912). Therefore, the intensive use of public oﬃces by service 
workers and laborers supports the argument that public oﬃces contributed 
to protecting job seekers from exploitation by private agencies. This means 
that the degree of asymmetric information between job- seekers and private 
agencies was lowered as an alternative job-  matching service was provided 
by public oﬃces at that time.
Besides the gender and occupations of job-  seekers using public oﬃces, 
interesting facts are revealed in Wisconsin and New York public oﬃces in 
1901. Table 5.3 shows some characteristics of public oﬃce applicants in Wis-
consin for six months (July to December 1901). Approximately 40 percent of 
Wisconsin public oﬃce users were non- U.S. citizens, 80 percent were single, 
Table 5.2  (continued)
CT MO IL
Occupation   Nation   State  
Public 
oﬃces   State  
Public 




Professionals and technical workers 6.9 8.0 0.0 6.6 0.0
Agricultural workers 20.1 4.6 2.7 24.3 8.3
Managers, oﬃcials, and proprietors 7.3 7.4 0.0 7.7 0.1
Clerical and kindred 9.2 12.2 1.3 10.0 1.3
Sales workers 6.7 6.1 3.3 7.2 0.7
Craftsmen and operatives 29.3 41.5 6.3 25.4 10.1
Service workers 9.7 9.2 67.4 9.1 20.0
Laborers   10.7   11.1   18.8   9.8   59.6        
Sources (tables 5.1 and 5.2): For 1900 occupation and gender distributions: State of Massachusetts Bu-
reau of Statistics of Labor 1904. For 1910 occupation and gender distributions: Illinois and Missouri, 
Sargent 1912; Connecticut, State of Connecticut Bureau of Labor Statistics 1912. For 1920 occupation 
and gender distributions: Missouri, State of Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics 1923; Connecticut, 
State of Connecticut Bureau of Labor Statistics 1922. For 1930 occupation and gender distributions: 
Missouri, State of Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Inspection 1930; Connecticut, State of 
Connecticut Bureau of Labor Statistics 1931. For the nation and states’ overall occupation and gender 
percents, IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2004).
Notes: The ﬁ  rst column is the classiﬁ  cation of the occupations. The second column displays the percents 
of occupations of workers in the nation. The third, ﬁ  fth, and seventh columns are the percents of occupa-
tions of workers in each state. The fourth, sixth, and eighth columns are the percentages of occupations 
of job- seekers placed through public employment oﬃces in each state. The categorization of the occupa-
tions in table 5.2 is based on IPUM’s 1950 occupation basis, which is the 1950 Census Bureau occupation 
classiﬁ  cation system with some modiﬁ  cations. Agricultural workers include farmers (owners, tenants, 
farm managers) and farm laborers. Craftsmen and operatives are skilled and semiskilled workers in 
manufacturing. All the percentages of the corresponding states and the nation are calculated from the 
labor force of working age (i.e., aged between sixteen and sixty-  ﬁ  ve, inclusive).Private Deception and the Rise of Public Employment Oﬃces    1 6 9
and only 4 percent were labor union members. Compared to workers in the 
nation, the share of immigrants who used public oﬃces in Wisconsin was 
higher by 13 percent. However, the diﬀerence in place of origin disappeared 
between public oﬃce users and the state workers. This may indicate that the 
share of immigrants using public oﬃces was large because the immigrant 
share of state workers was also high. The share of single public oﬃce users 
was much larger than that of the nation or of state workers (approximately 
80 percent for public oﬃces, 46 percent for the state population, and 43 
percent for the nation). One prominent feature was that only 26 percent of 
Table 5.3  Characteristics of Wisconsin Public Employment Oﬃce applicants 
in 1901
    Public oﬃces   State   Nation
Place of origin
U.S. born 63.8 63.1 77.1
Foreign born 36.2 36.9 22.9
Marital status
Married 20.1 53.8 57.0
Single 79.9 46.2 43.0
Place of birth
Wisconsin 26.3 49.4 54.3
Other U.S. 38.0 13.7 22.8
Other nations 36.2 36.9 22.9
Member of labor union
No 95.9
Yes 4.1
Years in the U.S. for immigrants







Over 30  9.2
Years of residence in Wisconsin
Less than 1  30.1
1–5 18.2
6–10 8.2
Over 11  18.1
Since birth   25.7        
Sources: State of Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics 1902 and IPUMS 
(Ruggles et al. 2004).
Notes: Among 4,744 applicants in Wisconsin public employment oﬃces from July to Decem-
ber 1901, 3,890 applicants ﬁ  lled at least one part of the application form. The ﬁ  rst column 
describes personal characteristics of workers. The second column shows the percentages of 
the corresponding characteristics of public oﬃce users. The third and fourth columns are the 
corresponding percentages of the labor force of working age (aged between sixteen and sixty-
 ﬁ ve, inclusive) in Wisconsin and the nation in 1900, respectively.170    Woong Lee
public oﬃce users were Wisconsin-  born (about 49 percent for the state and 
54 percent for the nation). In terms of residence, almost half of the job-
 seekers who used public oﬃces had resided in Wisconsin less than ﬁ  ve years 
(see the last part of table 5.3).
Table 5.4 describes several characteristics of public oﬃce applicants 
in New York State in 1901. One distinction is that table 5.4 also provides 
information on public oﬃce applicants separately by gender. Overall, 62 
percent of the applicants in New York public oﬃces were non-  U.S. citizens 
(36 percent for the state). By gender, 52 percent of men and 68 percent of 
women public oﬃce users were non-  U.S. citizens (versus 37 percent of men 
and 34 percent of women in the state population). Over 60 percent of the 
public oﬃce applicants were single and 4 percent were illiterate. In general, 
the share of single users was larger than that of state workers, although this 
inequality is reversed for women (the proportion of female public oﬃce users 
was 62.1 percent while the proportion of female workers in the state was 78 
percent). About 60 percent of public oﬃce users were between twenty and 
forty years of age (see the last part of the second column in table 5.4). The 
common similarity between Wisconsin and New York is that many of the 
Table 5.4  Characteristics of New York State Public Employment Oﬃce applicants 
in 1901
Public employment oﬃces New York State
    Overall   Men   Women   Overall   Men   Women
Place of origin
U.S. born 38.0 47.9 32.1 63.9 63.3 66.1
Foreign born 62.0 52.1 67.9 36.1 36.7 33.9
Marital status
Married 34.6 29.2 37.9 52.8 61.8 22.0
Single 65.4 70.8 62.1 47.2 38.2 78.0
Literacy
Literate 96.3 99.4 94.0 94.8 94.6 95.7
Illiterate 3.7 0.5 6.0 5.2 5.4 4.3
Age of applicants
Under 20 years 8.3 11.7 6.0
20–30 37.9 45.1 33.6
30–40 26.7 24.4 28.1
40–50 18.8 12.8 22.5
50–60 6.9 4.6 8.4
Over 60   1.3   1.3   1.3            
Sources: State of New York Department of Labor 1902 for public oﬃces; IPUMS (Ruggles 
et al. 2004) for New York State.
Note: The ﬁ  rst column describes personal characteristics of workers. The second, third, and 
fourth columns show the percentages of the corresponding characteristics of overall, men, 
and public oﬃce users, respectively. The ﬁ  fth, sixth, and seventh columns are the correspond-
ing percentages of, overall, male, and female workers in the labor force of working age in 1900, 
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public oﬃce users were single around the turn of the twentieth century. In 
New York’s case, it is clear that immigrants used public oﬃces more inten-
sively than U.S.-  born workers for their job search.
It is striking that 38 percent of public oﬃce applicants in Wisconsin were 
interstate migrants (U.S. citizens who migrated from other regions in the 
United States to Wisconsin). Moreover, 50 percent of them had resided in 
Wisconsin for less than ﬁ  ve years. The large proportion of recent migrants 
among public oﬃce users also supports the argument that public oﬃces 
helped lower the degree of asymmetric information between job-  seekers 
and private agencies because recent migrants from other states were more 
likely to be exploited by private agencies due to lack of information on the 
new environment. Even if the existence of public oﬃces did not cause people 
to migrate to Wisconsin, I can argue that once people moved to Wisconsin, 
they were likely to look for jobs with the help of public oﬃces if they could 
not rely on other networks, including private agencies.
In summary, most public oﬃce users were unskilled workers (service work-
ers or laborers), immigrants, or migrants in several states’ cases. These types 
of people were also major clients of private agencies in the early twentieth 
century. This fact, in part, supports the argument that public oﬃces provided 
an alternative job-  matching service for people who had low skills or were 
unfamiliar to their new environment, and thus more likely to be exploited 
by private agencies.
5.5    Empirical  Work
Theoretically, job-  seekers would be fully informed about the quality of 
private agencies as public oﬃces drive low- quality private agencies from the 
market. Consequently, job-  seekers could choose to use either public oﬃces 
or reputable private agencies: the establishment of public oﬃces can resolve 
adverse selection in the labor exchange market. Therefore, the most relevant 
empirical question from this theory is to explore whether the introduction 
or development of public oﬃces resolved the problem of adverse selection.17 
However, testing this hypothesis presents diﬃculties because information on 
private agencies in the early twentieth century is scarce.18
Instead, I test the hypothesis that public oﬃces helped lower the degree of 
asymmetric information for uninformed job- seekers. Even if this hypothesis 
is valid, it does not guarantee that adverse selection disappeared. However, it 
17. Throughout this chapter, I frequently mention “lower the degree of asymmetric informa-
tion” and “resolve the problem of adverse selection.” Lowering the degree of asymmetric infor-
mation is a process to resolve adverse selection because eliminating the asymmetric information 
problem is necessary to resolve adverse selection. Therefore, when information symmetry is 
achieved, low-  quality private agencies are driven out of the market, and consequently adverse 
selection disappears.
18. To test the problem of adverse selection directly, detailed data on private agencies are 
required, such as fees charged by private agencies.172    Woong Lee
does tell us that public oﬃces were directed to resolve the problem of adverse 
selection, because lowering the degree of asymmetric information between 
job-  seekers and private agencies is a part of that process. This hypothesis 
was proposed in the last section and in part supported by the ﬁ  ndings on the 
types of workers who used public oﬃces. I extend this analysis to an empiri-
cal test by examining the relationship between the use of public oﬃces by 
job- seekers (in terms of the number of job- seekers using public oﬃces) and 
labor market conditions related to asymmetric information.
To test the hypothesis, a statistical model is constructed. The model 
describes the relationship between the use of public oﬃces by job-  seekers 
and labor market conditions, including proxy variables for asymmetric infor-
mation. If the use of public oﬃces and the asymmetric information factors 
are positively related, then the relationship may support the hypothesis. A 
positive correlation would indicate that the use of public oﬃces increased as 
the number of people who were vulnerable to the abuses by private agencies 
due to lack of information increased. Hence, public oﬃces contributed to 
lessening the degree of asymmetric information for uninformed job- seekers 
who were more likely to be exploited by private agencies.
I collected data for the use of public oﬃces by job-  seekers from annual 
reports and monthly bulletins published by the USES. I narrowed my empir-
ical analysis to 1920 and 1930 because most of the labor market data at state 
or at lower regional levels are available decennially. Moreover, public oﬃces 
were not inﬂ  uential as a labor market intermediary before World War I (see 
ﬁ  gure 5.2). I also limited the samples of explanatory variables to the labor 
force of working age (i.e., aged between sixteen and sixty-  ﬁ  ve, inclusive) in 
urban areas.19 The regression model is as follows:
ln(USE)it      1 ln(WAGE )it  2 ln(EMPLOYMENT)it 
 3 ln(INCOME)it  4 ln(WOMEN)it  5 ln(SINGLE)it 
 6 ln(DSE)it  7 ln(ILLITERATE)it 
 8 ln(IMMIGRANT)it  9 ln(MIGRANT)it 
 10 ln(SERVICE)it  11 ln(LABOR)it  Dt  XitB  εit.
The dependent variable USEit measures the use of public oﬃces by job-
  seekers in terms of the number of applicants who used public oﬃces. The 
subscripts i and t indicate state and year (1920 and 1930), respectively. 
WAGE, EMPLOYMENT, and INCOME are chosen to control for general 
labor market conditions.20 For the data regarding the wage and employment 
19. By deﬁ  nition, job- seekers using public oﬃces are in the labor force and most of them are 
in the working age population. Most public oﬃces before the Great Depression were located 
in major cities (Kellogg 1933; Breen 1997).
20. These three variables are not limited to working age population in the labor force in urban 
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levels, “Estimates of Average Manufacturing Wages by State” and “Total 
Employment by State” are used, respectively (Fishback and Kantor 2000).21 
To control for level of income, I employ “Realized national income,” which 
is an estimate consisting of “the total of payments to individuals by business 
and government in the form of wages, salaries, dividends, interest, net rents 
and royalties, and net proﬁ  ts withdrawn by unincorporated enterprises” (Na-
tional Industrial Conference Boards, Inc. 1939, 114).
Other explanatory variables are selected based on the analysis of the types 
of public oﬃce users in the last section and constructed from Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) extracts (Ruggles et al. 2004) of 1920 
and 1930 samples. WOMEN and SINGLE are estimates of the numbers 
of women and single workers. The last six variables (DSE, ILLTERATE, 
IMMIGRANT, MIGRANT, SERVICE, and LABOR) are proxy variables 
for asymmetric information. In the early twentieth century, immigrants, 
migrants, and unskilled workers were vulnerable to the abuses of private 
agencies due to lack of information about the area or less education. Variable 
DSE is the number of people who did not speak English and ILLITERATE 
is the number of people who were illiterate (i.e., cannot read or write) in any 
language. I add DSE and ILLITERATE for asymmetric information proxies 
because these workers were less likely to be educated and thus seemed to be 
vulnerable to exploitation by private agencies. The variable IMMIGRANT is 
the number of non- U.S. citizens; MIGRANT is the total number of migrants 
who were U.S. citizens; SERVICE is the number of service workers; and 
LABOR is the number of laborers. MIGRANT is a measure of interstate 
migration, which is estimated based on whether a person lived in the state in 
which he or she was born at the time of the Census (Rosenbloom and Sund-
strom 2004). Variable Dt is a time dummy and Xit indicates the interaction 
terms between time and region dummies, to control for unobserved factors, 
in part, correlated with the explanatory variables over time or region.22
The summary statistics for the variables are shown in table 5.5 and the 
results of the regression analysis are provided in tables 5.6 and 5.7. First, I 
run cross- sectional regressions for 1920 and 1930 separately—the results are 
shown in table 5.6. Overall, signs of the key estimates are not signiﬁ  cant in 
most speciﬁ  cations. However, the estimates for MIGRANT, which indicate 
the relationship between the use of public oﬃces and interstate migration, 
are positive and signiﬁ  cant. This pattern may imply that public oﬃces helped 
migrants who were unfamiliar with their new environment and thus most 
likely to be abused by private agencies in their job search.
Table 5.7 presents the results for the unbalanced panel regressions with 
21. “Total Employment by State” is the estimate of the number of employed workers of all 
kinds in each state.
22. The Census division is used for the regional classiﬁ  cation in this chapter: New England, 
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, 
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ﬁ  xed and random eﬀects.23 In general, as in the case of cross- sectional regres-
sions, most of the signs for the estimates are not signiﬁ  cant. However, the 
estimates are signiﬁ  cant for ILLITERATE and MIGRANT but negative for 
ILLITERATE and positive for MIGRANT. The negative sign for ILLIT-
ERATE is understandable, since applicants of public oﬃces had to ﬁ  ll out 
application forms when they registered and had to have interviews with the 
agents in public oﬃces. Positive estimates for MIGRANT are consistent with 
the results in the cross- sectional analyses. The magnitude and signiﬁ  cance of 
the estimates for MIGRANT increase after controlling for time and region-
 speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
This positive and signiﬁ  cant relationship between the use of public oﬃces 
by job-  seekers and interstate migration reaﬃrms the hypothesis that public 
oﬃces contributed to lowering the degree of asymmetric information, espe-
cially in favor of migrants who were most lacking in information and net-
works in their new environment.
5.6    Conclusion
Progressive Era (1890s through 1920s) social reformers viewed unin-
formed job-  seekers as vulnerable to exploitation by private employment 
agencies. In response to the cries of these people, public employment oﬃces 
Table 5.5  Descriptive statistics
1920 1930
Variable   Observations   Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Observations   Mean  
Standard 
deviation
USE 49 52,861.9 85,955.8 44 54,707.8 72,237.6
WAGE 48 33.3 6.3 43 31.7 6.2
EMPLOYMENT 48 812,186.8 827,466.0 43 980,432.3 990,891.5
INCOME 49 1,398.1 1,780.3 44 1,606.5 2,276.0
WOMEN 49 115,384.6 174,173.1 44 165,598.7 226,613.4
SINGLE 49 189,663.1 297,903.9 44 225,468.7 350,049.2
ILLITERATE 49 19,242.1 29,545.0 44 16,841.8 24,218.5
DSE 49 12,205.5 25,143.8 44 7,618.6 15,561.4
IMMIGRANT 49 68,477.5 149,007.6 44 59,149.3 129,509.9
MIGRANT 49 114,209.6 116,875.0 44 170,187.3 203,006.5
SERVICE 49 49,039.0 68,972.4 44 76,454.7 102,278.1
LABOR   49   59,797.2   78,326.9   44   69,591.3   87,410.9
Sources: USE (for 1920, U.S. Employment Service 1921; for 1930, U.S. Employment Service January 
1930 to December 1930). WAGE and EMPLOYMENT (Fishback, Price, and Kantor 2000). INCOME 
(National Industrial Conference Board Inc. 1939). Others (Ruggles et al. 2004).
23. The balanced and unbalanced panel regressions produce nearly identical coeﬃcient esti-
mates.Table 5.6  Relationship between the use of public employment oﬃces and 
asymmetric information-  1: Cross section for 1920 and 1930 separately 
Dependent variable: ln (USE).
Explanatory variable


















Region ﬁ  xed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
ln(WAGE ) 1.68∗∗∗ 1.17∗ 1.69 2.38
(0.53) (0.61) (1.80) (1.84)
ln(EMPLOYMENT) –0.28∗∗ –0.32∗ 0.25 –0.58
(0.13) (0.18) (1.07) (1.04)
ln(INCOME) –2.32 –3.40∗ –3.10 –4.24
(1.54) (1.68) (2.80) (2.65)
ln(WOMEN) –1.05 –1.14 –1.83 –4.84∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.85) (2.06) (1.80)
ln(SINGLE) 1.07 2.31∗ 0.43 2.51
(0.87) (1.13) (1.90) (1.78)
ln(DSE) –0.27∗∗∗ –0.22∗∗ –0.16 –0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
ln(ILLITERATE) –0.60∗∗∗ –0.43 –0.11 –0.19
(0.25) (0.36) (0.20) (0.19)
ln(IMMIGRANT) 0.46∗∗∗ 0.35 0.37 –0.29
(0.16) (0.24) (0.26) (0.36)
ln(MIGRANT) 0.83∗∗ 0.93∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.50) (0.41) (0.60)
ln(SERVICE) –0.03 –0.34 –1.10 0.68
(0.66) (0.78) (0.69) (0.97)
ln(LABOR) –0.50 –1.36∗ 0.64 –0.11
(0.51) (0.70) (0.59) (0.91)
Constant –14.40∗∗∗ –2.27 –12.79 –11.90
(5.78) (8.07) (12.87) (12.46)
R2 0.86 0.91 0.75 0.86
Total observations   48   48   43   43
Notes: USE (dependent variable): the number of applicants who used public oﬃces in a state 
in a year. WAGE: average manufacturing wages in a state in a year. EMPLOYMENT: total 
employment in a state in a year. INCOME: realized income in a state in a year. WOMEN: the 
number of women in a state in a year. SINGLE: the number of singles in a state in a year. DSE: 
the number of people who did not speak English in a state in a year. ILLITERATE: the num-
ber of illiterate in any language in a state in a year. IMMIGRANT: the number of non-  U.S. 
citizens in a state in a year. MIGRANT: the number of migrants who were U.S. citizens in a 
state in a year. SERVICE: the number of service workers in a state in a year. LABOR: the 
number of laborers in a state in a year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Table 5.7  Relationship between the use of public employment oﬃces and asymmetric 
information-  2: Panel regressions (unbalanced). Dependent variable: ln (USE).
Explanatory variable














Time dummy (1920) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time∗region No Yes No Yes
ln(WAGE ) –1.44 –1.50 0.93∗ 0.94∗
(1.30) (1.69) (0.52) (0.57)
ln(EMPLOYMENT) 0.39 0.46 –0.19 –0.27
(0.48) (0.53) (0.22) (0.24)
ln(INCOME) 3.15 2.64 –1.10 –1.03
(2.68) (3.22) (1.28) (1.32)
ln(WOMEN) –1.53 –1.82 –0.89 0.11
(1.62) (2.00) (0.64) (0.83)
ln(SINGLE) 2.49∗ 1.91 1.09 0.24
(1.43) (2.06) (0.74) (0.88)
ln(DSE) 0.15 0.18 –0.03 –0.03
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09)
ln(ILLITERATE) –1.70∗∗ –1.82∗∗ –0.68∗∗∗ –0.69∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.72) (0.20) (0.21)
ln(IMMIGRANT) –0.16 –0.25 0.12 0.16
(0.47) (0.49) (0.17) (0.18)
ln(MIGRANT) 1.39 2.48∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.57∗
(1.07) (1.23) (0.29) (0.31)
ln(SERVICE) 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.04
(1.11) (1.24) (0.56) (0.58)
ln(LABOR) –0.07 0.76 –0.19 0.05
(1.05) (1.23) (0.43) (0.46)
Constant 9.28 1.16 –9.38∗ –9.11
(23.70) (29.03) (5.39) (5.74)
R2
Within 0.36 0.56 0.14 0.25
Between 0.09 0.34 0.85 0.87
Overall 0.12 0.37 0.77 0.82
Total observations 90 90 90 90
Total group   47   47   47   47
Note: FE  ﬁ  xed eﬀects; RE  random eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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were introduced to restrain private employment agencies from exploitation 
of job- seekers. I describe this situation as a case of asymmetric information 
between job- seekers and private agencies that could cause adverse selection 
in the labor exchange market. Creation of public employment oﬃces can 
be viewed as a policy device to eliminate low-  quality private employment 
agencies that were committing malpractices with respect to job-  seekers.
My analysis shows that the majority of job-  seekers who utilized public 
employment oﬃces were unskilled workers, immigrants, or migrants, who 
were also major clients of private employment agencies at that time. One 
of the most interesting ﬁ  ndings is a positive relationship between the use of 
public employment oﬃces and interstate migration in 1920 and 1930. This 
supports the hypothesis that public employment oﬃces lessened the degree 
of asymmetric information in favor of migrants in the labor exchange mar-
ket. In other words, public employment oﬃces were especially helpful for 
migrants who were most lacking in information and networks in their new 
environment.
Despite the importance of public employment oﬃces in the early twenti-
eth century, current trends are the reduction in public funding and privatiza-
tion of public employment services in response to a decrease in their usage 
by job-  seekers.24 This could be in part due to ineﬃcient operation of public 
employment oﬃces in recent periods (De Koning, Denys, and Walwei 1999). 
However, the role of public employment oﬃces is still relevant with respect 
to the asymmetric information problem in the labor exchange market. Autor 
and Houseman (2005) found that temporary help agencies provide low-
  skilled workers with jobs that have lower wages and shorter employment 
durations than do direct-  hire jobs. There is a possibility that this ineﬀective 
outcome of temporary help agencies may result from asymmetric informa-
tion between low-  skilled workers and temporary help agencies. Temporary 
help agencies may have an incentive to make use of this information asym-
metry to exploit their employees, which is an ineﬃcient market outcome. 
In addition, services by public employment oﬃces are always pertinent for 
certain groups such as illegal immigrants, very low-  skilled workers, or low-
  educated workers who have little information about the labor market and 
little recourse to recover damages if exploited.
As a ﬁ  nal remark, the focus of this chapter was on the supply side (job-
 seekers), but it is also important to investigate the demand side, the activities 
of private employment agencies, and their interactions with public employ-
ment oﬃces. The direct test of adverse selection in the labor exchange mar-
ket requires detailed information on private employment agencies such as 
fees charged by private employment agencies and the corresponding clients’ 
characteristics. I plan to explore this in future work.
24. Approximately 19 percent of the unemployed used public employment oﬃces in the 
United States in 2001, while 30 percent did in the 1970s (Eberts and Holzer 2004).178    Woong Lee
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